Pandemic clinical case definitions are non-specific: multiple respiratory viruses circulating in the early phases of the 2009 influenza pandemic in New South Wales, Australia by Vigneswary Ratnamohan et al.
Ratnamohan et al. Virology Journal 2014, 11:113
http://www.virologyj.com/content/11/1/113SHORT REPORT Open AccessPandemic clinical case definitions are non-
specific: multiple respiratory viruses circulating in
the early phases of the 2009 influenza pandemic
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Sheena Adamson5, Jen Kok1,6,7 and Dominic E Dwyer1,2,6,7*Abstract
Background: During the early phases of the 2009 pandemic, subjects with influenza-like illness only had laboratory
testing specific for the new A(H1N1)pdm09 virus.
Findings: Between 25th May and 7th June 2009, during the pandemic CONTAIN phase, A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was
detected using nucleic acid tests in only 56 of 1466 (3.8%) samples meeting the clinical case definition required for
A(H1N1)pdm09 testing. Two hundred and fifty-five randomly selected A(H1N1)pdm09 virus-negative samples were
tested for other respiratory viruses using a real-time multiplex PCR assay. Of the 255 samples tested, 113 (44.3%)
had other respiratory viruses detected: rhinoviruses 63.7%, seasonal influenza A 17.6%, respiratory syncytial virus
7.9%, human metapneumovirus 5.3%, parainfluenzaviruses 4.4%, influenza B virus 4.4%, and enteroviruses 0.8%. Viral
co-infections were present in 4.3% of samples.
Conclusions: In the very early stages of a new pandemic, limiting testing to only the novel virus will miss other
clinically important co-circulating respiratory pathogens.
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The emergence of a novel pathogen of pandemic poten-
tial, as occurred in 2009 with the influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus, requires the development of clinical case
definitions to assist in managing the clinical, laboratory
and public health responses to the new disease. A
(H1N1)pdm09 virus is a quadruple reassortant virus of
mostly swine-origin influenza genes that was first re-
ported in the United States of America (USA) on 24th
April 2009 [1], although it was believed to have emerged
in Mexico earlier [2].* Correspondence: dominic.dwyer@sydney.edu.au
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article, unless otherwise stated.The Australian Health Management Plan for Pan-
demic Influenza (AHMPPI) [3], was executed prior to
the declaration of pandemic influenza by the World
Health Organisation on the 11th June 2009. Specific test-
ing for A(H1N1)pdm09 virus began on the 28th April at
the start of the ALERT phase. The ALERT phase was
defined as the period when only a few cases of A(H1N1)
pdm09 had been reported in a few countries, but not in
Australia, with control measures implemented for quar-
antine purposes [3]. The CONTAIN phase defined the
period when the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus had arrived in
Australia with few confirmed infections or small clusters
of cases, with measures in place for the rapid identification
of infections and containment [3]. The first Australian
cases were imported from the Americas; the first locally-
acquired case in New South Wales (NSW) was identified on
the 20th May: a 3 year old whose mother had acquired
laboratory-confirmed A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection duringentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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phase between 22nd May and 16th June, all laboratory re-
quests were triaged to limit testing to individuals who met
the CONTAIN phase clinical case definition: individuals
showing symptoms of influenza-like illness (ILI) within
7 days of travel to A(H1N1)pdm09-declared areas, or people
with febrile respiratory illness with onset within 7 days of
contact with a laboratory-confirmed case [5]. Although clin-
ical case definitions may be sensitive for a newly circulating
pandemic virus, it may lack specificity, and testing algo-
rithms detecting the novel virus alone will fail to detect
other co-circulating respiratory viruses.
Within Australia during the early pandemic phases, the
cities of Melbourne and Brisbane reported cases earlier than
Sydney (NSW). Following the first laboratory-confirmed A
(H1N1)pdm09 case in NSW, another six influenza A cases
were reported on the 24th May from passengers of a cruise
ship that had departed Sydney on a 10-day cruise in the
Pacific Ocean on the 16th May. The ship stopped at New
Caledonia and Vanuatu, islands that had not reported circu-
lation of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus at the time [6]. Combined
nose and throat swabs collected in viral transport medium
were tested for A(H1N1)pdm09 virus by nucleic acid tests
(NAT) at the WHO National Influenza Centre in Sydney.
Between the 25th May and the 7th June, 1466 patient sam-
ples met the CONTAIN-phase definition for laboratory test-
ing, of which 56 (3.8%) were positive for A(H1N1)pdm09
virus by NAT. Of these, 43/56 reported a travel history out-
side Australia, including the 37 passengers on the cruise ship
and six with a history of air travel to other countries. From
the 4-7th June, 13 locally acquired cases from known con-
tacts were identified, 11 from contacts within Australia and
two from people who had recently returned from the USA.
Samples received from the 25th May to 7th June were con-
sidered representative of the population suffering from ILI
not requiring hospitalisation. As A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was
only detected in 3.8% of samples, we performed NAT for
other respiratory viruses on randomly selected samples col-
lected from subjects that had met the clinical case definition
during the CONTAIN phase.
Following A(H1N1)pdm09 virus-specific NAT as pre-
viously described [7], further NAT for other respiratory
viruses was performed on residual cDNA or extracted
total nucleic acid (NA) stored at either −20°C or −70°C.
The cDNA was prepared from NA primed with random
hexamers using Superscript III RT enzyme (InVitrogen
Life Technologies, Carlsbed, CA, USA), according to the
manufacturer’s protocol. NAT was carried out on the
Roche LC 480 real-time instrument (Roche Diagnostics
GmbH, Mannheim, Germany) in a multiplex format,
with influenza A, influenza B and respiratory syncytial
virus (RSV) targets in one primer set; parainfluenza-
viruses 1, 2 and 3 in the second set; and human metap-
neumovirus (hMPV), rhinoviruses and enteroviruses inthe third set. Human adenoviruses and a house-keeping
gene, beta-globin (used as a sample inhibition control) [8],
were tested directly from the NA extract and formed the
fourth set.
Four μLs of cDNA or extract was amplified in a total
volume of 20 μL with 0.5 μM of each primer and
0.2 μM of each probe and 10 μL of Lightcycler Probes
Master (Roche Diagnostics GmbH) in the LC480 micro-
well plate. Primers and probes were designed in-house
or chosen from previous publications [9-11] and opti-
mised so that all targets were efficiently amplified under
the same conditions. The assay was evaluated against a
panel of known positive and negative respiratory speci-
mens [12]. To increase the sensitivity of detection of the
commonly known serotypes of rhinoviruses, enterovi-
ruses and adenoviruses, two sets of primers and/or 2
probes were used for each of the virus groups (Table 1).
The Taqman real-time PCR assay conditions consisted of
denaturation (95°C - 10 min) and amplification (40 cycles
of 95°C - 10 sec, 58°C −15 sec, 72°C - 20 sec).
Clinical information was gathered from individual test
request forms and NetEpi, the NSW Health surveillance
system; data was unavailable for 38 individuals. As the
clinical case definition was strictly applied in the early
CONTAIN phase, we assume that all subjects without
any clinical information recorded on the request form
met the testing criteria. Results are shown in Table 2. Of
255 samples tested (collected from 219 adults, 33 chil-
dren and 3 with no age recorded), 113 (44.3%) had one
or more respiratory viruses detected: 72 (63.7%) rhinovi-
ruses, 20 (17.6%) seasonal influenza A viruses (16 A/
H3N2 and 4 A/H1N1), 9 (7.9%) RSV, 6 (5.3%) hMPV, 5
(4.4%) each of influenza B and parainfluenzaviruses and
1 (0.8%) enterovirus. Five viral co-infections were identi-
fied, four with RSV and rhinoviruses, and one with influ-
enza A/H3N2 and rhinovirus. No human adenoviruses
were detected. The respiratory virus detection rate in
the paediatric sub-group was 63.6% (21/33 tested), with
12 rhinoviruses, 3 influenza A/H3N2, 2 RSV, 1 parain-
fluenzavirus 2, 1 enterovirus and 2 co-infections with
RSV and rhinoviruses.
In the present study, despite limiting laboratory testing
to those meeting the clinical case definition, A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus was only detected in 3.8% of cases during
the early CONTAIN phase; rhinoviruses instead were
the most commonly detected virus. Although the sam-
ples were collected from subjects in an outpatient set-
ting in this study, rhinoviruses have also been identified
as the most common virus detected in hospitalised chil-
dren presenting with an acute respiratory infection [13].
Outbreaks of rhinovirus infection, sometimes causing se-
vere disease, have also been reported in long-term care
facilities and in elderly adults presenting with respiratory
distress to hospital emergency departments [14,15]. In
Table 1 Primer and probe sequences used in the respiratory virus multiplex assays
Virus (target gene) Name Sequence (5′ to 3′ end) Reference
RSV (nucleoprotein) RSVF For: tagtgtrcargcagaaatgg in-house
RSVAR Rev: agtgrggaaattgagtcaaagat in-house
RSVBR Rev: rggraattgagttaatgacagc in-house
RSVP Probe: FAM tgatgcttttggrttrttcaatatatgg BHQ1 in-house
Influenza A (matrix) AMF2 For: atggaatggctaaagacaagac [9]
AMR2 Rev: cattkagggcattytggac in-house
AMP Probe: Cal fluo Red610 acgctgcagtcctcgctcact BHQ2 in-house
Influenza B (nucleoprotein) BNF For: yaacgatgacatggagagaaac in-house
BNR Rev: gcctcctgttttgttgtgatc in-house
BNP Probe: Quasor670 ccttctttsacatctctggcattctt BHQ2 in-house
Parainfluenza 1 (matrix) PI1F For: yggaacatcactaggtacaatyac in-house
PI1R Rev: gagcttcttttctccatcatc in-house
Para1P Probe: aactcttgcagatcttgcattaccg in-house
Parainfluenza 2 (matrix) PI2F For: tcactgtggtcagttggatgt in-house
PI2R Rev: ctcaaatgtccgttgacctg in-house
Para2P Quasor670 aagaatctgatcttaatgagctaatgggc BHQ2 in-house
Parainfluenza 3 (matrix) PI3F For: Cal fluo Red610 gaagtgagaagaacagtyaaagc BHQ2 in-house
PI3R Rev: cattgaggagcaagagcaac in-house
Para3P Probe FAM ttggcatcgaacarcattcc BHQ1 in-house
Rhino & Entero (5′UTR) Rhi3A For: gcccctgaatgyggctaa [10]
Rhi4B Rev: gaaacacggacacccaaagta [10]
Rhi1P Probe: FAM tggtcccrtcccgcamttgc BHQ1 in-house
Rhi2P Probe: FAM ccrtcccrsaattgctcrttacgac BHQ1 in-house
Ent1P Probe: Cal fluo Red610 cggttccgctgcrgagttrccc BHQ2 in-house
Ent2P Probe: Cal fluo Red610 cggttccgccacrgacttrcgc BHQ2 in-house
hMPV (nucleoprotein) Meta NLNF For: catayaarcatgctatattaaaagagtctc [11]
Meta NLNR Rev: cctatytctgcagcatatttgtaatcag [11]
MetaP Probe:Quasor670 tcttgytgcaatgatgarggtgtyactgc BHQ2 [11]
Adeno (hexon) AdeF For: caaggaygtmaacatgatcctgcag in-house
AdeF For: raaggatgtdaacatgrtbctdcag in-house
AdeR Rev: cgttggtrtcgttrcgcagcat in-house
AdeR Rev: crttggtrtcrttycknarcat in-house
Ade1P Probe: FAM trgaagckgtgttrtgwgccatggg BHQ1 in-house
Ade2P Probe: FAM tggaggcsgtgttgtgsgccatggg BHQ1 in-house
Human Beta-globin PCO3 For: acacaactgtgttcactagc [8]
PCO4 Rev: caacttcatccacgttcacc [8]
BGLP Probe: Quasor670 tcaaacagacaccatggtgcacctga BHQ2 in-house
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pdm09 virus infection during the 2009 pandemic at two
hospital emergency departments in France, rhinovirus
infection rates were also higher than A(H1N1)pdm09
virus infection rates (62.6% vs. 16.5%) [16]. In our study,
the rate of rhinovirus infection in travellers and contacts
of cases was similar. Other respiratory viruses contributedapproximately 20% of infections. Viral co-infections were
also uncommon, possibly from sampling bias as viral co-
infection may be associated with more severe disease.
Clinical syndromes defining typical influenza virus in-
fection overlap with those described for other respiratory
viruses. Non-specific case definitions, along with public
health, media and clinical demands (given that the first
Table 2 Detection rates of respiratory viruses (*denotes co-infection)




RSV Influenza A Influenza B Parainfluenza 1 Parainfluenza 2 Parainfluenza 3 Rhinovirus Enterovirus hMPV Adenovirus None
detected
From Americas 40 1 (+RV*) 1 H3 1 0 0 0 13 0 3 0 22
Cruise ships 77 0 5 H3 0 0 0 0 20 1 1 0 50
Western Pacific Region
(Fiji, Vanuatu, N Zealand,
Singapore, China, H Kong,
Philippines)
9 0 2 H3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4
From Europe 12 1 1 H3 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5
South East Asia Region
(Indonesia, Thailand,
S Korea, India)
7 1 (+RV*) 1 H1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3
From Japan 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
From Africa (Ethiopia) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Interstate travel
(Melbourne)
16 0 2 H3 0 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 9
No travel, but in contact
with travellers, confirmed
or suspected
20 1 0 3 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 10
Overseas travel, location
unknown
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
No record of travel or






0 0 1 0 7 (1 + RSV*) 0 0 0 13




1 0 0 2 10 (1 + RSV*)
(1 + H3*)
0 0 0 21
TOTAL 255 9 20 (16 H3
and 4 H1)
5 0 2 3 72 1 6 0 142
Number of patients with
a viral infection = 113
Number of patients with
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enza and respiratory virus season), may contribute to
unrealistic pressures on laboratories. Using a broad clin-
ical case definition (even when limiting it only to travel-
lers) in the early phases of a new pandemic or following
emergence of other novel respiratory viruses overseas, as
exemplified by the recent emergence of the Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome-coronavirus [17] is non-specific.
Pathogen-specific NAT using a sensitive, but non-specific
case definition targeted to a new pathogen is needed in a
containment phase for management of infected patients
and related public health issues. However, this approach
will miss many other respiratory viruses that in themselves
may have clinical significance in certain populations, even
if not hospitalised.
Even prior to the widespread transmission of A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus in Australia, limiting testing to travellers
did not improve the specificity of testing. Furthermore,
if laboratories use NAT to determine other causes of in-
fection, testing capacity in an outbreak may soon be
reached. However, when the causative pathogen of an
outbreak has been identified and the outbreak has pro-
gressed beyond containment, then the testing algorithms
need revision to target only specific indications, such as
a location of new or significant clusters, or for individ-
uals at risk of severe disease.
In conclusion, laboratory testing specifically targeting
only the new virus will miss other clinically important co-
circulating respiratory pathogens in the very early stages
of a pandemic. Detecting the presence of other viruses
may provide important information on the impact of pre-
existing viruses when a new pandemic virus is circulating.
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